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INTRODUCTION
This paper considers economies where agents can buy and sell indivisible goods and in which all payments are made :in units of a divisible good that, following standard use, we will call money. This model is probably closer to many circumstances of exchange in the real world than the standard model in which all goods are assumed to be perfectly divisible, but is also more difficult to analyze. The use of marginal calculus is precluded, and the application of fixed point theorems based on continuity properties, still possible in some cases, is certainly not straightforward. In consequence the model has beer! studied under restrictive assumptions, which are progressively being relaxed. Until recently it was assumed either that all the indivisible goods were all units of the same good (Henry (1970) , or that buyers had use only for one type of indivisible good (KanekcYamarnoto (1986)), or just for one of the indivisible goods: this case covers most of the literature on assignment games and matching models (see Roth and Sotomayor for a comprehensive account of the results) and competitive equilibria of economies with indivisibilities (Kaneko (1982) , Quinzii (1984) , Gale (1984) ). Recently several papers (Bikhchandani and Mamer (1994) , Van der Laan, Talman and Yang (1995), Gul and Stacchetti (1996) ) have relaxed this assumption, and assumed that agents have use for several units of the indivisible goods, units which may be differentiated.
With the exception of Bikhchandani and Mamer (1994) who show that, if there are two types of agents with quasilinear utilities such that all agents of the same type have the same supermodular and increasing reservation values, a competitive equilibrium exists, all the results of these papers follow from assumptions of the agents' demand functions rather than on their utility functions. Van der Laan and Talman (1995) impose a condition on agents' demands which seems to require separability of the utility functions with respect to the indivisible goods but not quasi-linearity in money, while Gul and Stacchetti impose that the utilities be quasi-linear in money and that the demands satisfy the property of Gross Substituability (to be formally defined in Section 2) introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) for a two-sided matching model between firms and workers. In contrast, this paper studies a class of economies which is defined by restrictions on the agents' utility functions. First, the utilities are quasi-linear in money so that the preferences can be represented by reservation values for subsets of the available indivisible objects. Second, these reservation values are submodular i.e. tke marginal utility of an object decreases when the set of objects to which it is added becomes larger. Last and not th.e least, this marginal utility depends only on the number of objects and not on the composition of the set to which it is added.
This last assumption, that we call the Cardinality Condition, is certainly strong. At the m o m e~t however, it is the only interpretable condition that we have found which precludes that, for at least one agent, some objects "fit" better together than when they are associated with other objects-a situation which seems to cause nonexistence of an equilibrium even with decreasing marginal utilities (see the example of non-existence in Section 2 or the one in Gul and Stacchetti (1996) ). Under the assumption that utilities are submodular and satisfy the Cardinality Condition we show that the set of equilibrium prices is non-empty, is a convex complete lattice and thus admits a vector pM of maximum and a vector pm of minimum equilibrium prices. Moreover these prices have a natural economic interpretation: the maxirrpm price phi(a) of an object a is the contribution of this object to the social welfare, or its social value, while its minimum price pm(a) is its value in its second best use (these notions are precisely defined in Section 3).
The proofs of the papers follow the route of the Second Welfare Theorem of Welfare Economics: we characterize the prices which support the efficient assignments of the objects, and use wry few properties of agents' demands. In particular we do not use the property of Gross Substitutuability, which is the basis for the prooh of similar results by Gul and Stacchetti (1996) , although this property is satisfied by the demands of agents whose utility functions satisfy our assumptions. Our proofs are thus alternative proofs to those of Gul and Stacchetti. Being based on the study of the efficient assignments of the objects, they uncover properties of these efficient assignments which are of interest in themselves, and may be used to obtain results of comparative statics for this class of economy (see in particular Lemma 3.3 which describes some regularities of the efficient assignments when new objects are added to the available objects)
The paper is organized as follows: the model and an example of nonexistence of equilibrium motivating the Clardinality Condition is presented in Section 2. The characterization of the prices supporting the efficient assignments of economies with submodular utility functions satisfying the Cardinality Condition is the subject of Section 3. Section 4 discusses the relation between the Cardinality Condition and the property of Gross Substitutability of demands.
The Model
Consider an exchange economy e with a finite set I of agents (whose elements are denoted by i, j, ...), a finiteset R of indivisible objects (whose elements are denoted by a, P, ...), and a perfectly divisible good called money. Agents' preferences are quasi-linear: the utility that agent i E I derives from consuming a set of objects A can be characterized by a reservation d u e V ( i , A) which represents the quantity of money that agent i is ready to sacrifice in order to consume the objects in A.
The utility of agent i holding mi units of money and the set A of objects is thus For all i E I, the reservation value fmction V(i, .), defined on the power set P(R), is assumed to be weakly increasing (V(i,A) 5 V(i, B) whenever A c B) and to satisfy V(i, 0) = 0.
Agents' endowments, with mi 1 0 and uiCl& = 0, are assumed to be such that mi 2 V(i, fl) for all i E 1'. This assumption implies that whenever the price of a set A of objects is less than the reservation value V(i, A), agent i can afford to buy the objects in A.
Let E denote the set of economies satisfying tl;. abwe conditions. ,' or an economy e E E an assignment a of objects to agents is thus a partition of the objects among the agents. Let C ( I , a ) denote all possible assignments. A feasible -allocation of e is a pair (a, m) E E(I, 0) x R:' such that zsEI m, = CiEl m,.
A Pareto optimal allocation is a feasible allocation (a, m) such that there does not exist any other feasible allocation weakly preferred by all agents and strictly preferred by at least one agent. Of special interest in quasi-linear economies in which endowments of money are such that the nonnegativity constraints on money holdings never bind, are the Pareto optimal allocations in which all agents' consumption of money is positive. These are the only Pareto optimal allocations which can possibly be obtained as competitive equilibrium allocations. As is well known, they are found by maximizing the sum of agents' utilities subject to the feasibility constraints, In this model they are the feasible allocations associated to the assignments which maximize the sum of the agents' reservation values.
Such an assignment a, satisfying is called an eficient assignment.
Suppose that the objects are exchanged on a market at prices @(a)),,*.
(Prices are expressed in units of money). If agent i buys the set A of objects he -will pay p(A) = CaEA p(a). The demand of objects D(i,p) of agent i at the price vector p = @(a)),En is defined by
The demand of agent i for money is then m, Suppose that 7 is another efficient assignment. Then
is not an equilibrium if at least one of the inequalities is strict.
But then, summing the inequalities leads to which contradicts that T is efficient. Thus (r,p) is an equilibrium.
There exists a competitive equilibrium if and only if there is at least one efficient assignment supported by a price vector. By the above reasoning, this holds if and only if every efficient assignment is supported by a price vector.
The existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed (even without the assumption of quasi-linearity of preferences) if the a.gents have utility for at most one object and additional restrictions must be placed on the reservation value functions.
A condition that seems particularly attractive since it expresses, in the case of indivisible goods, the idea tbat the marginal utility of an additional item decreases when the bundle of goods to which it is added gets larger, is the assumption of submodularity. Submodularity of the reservation values still permits complicated interdependence in utility among objects, which prevent the existence of an equilibrium.
In the previous example, if agent 2 has objects a and 0 , then the marginal contribution of a is equal to its value V(2, a ) since V(2, a p ) -V(2, P) = 13 -5 = 8 = V(2,a), while if objects CY and 7 are combined the marginal contribution of a is much lower: V(2, cry) -V(2,7) = 14 -10 < V(2, a ) . Thus, for agent 2, having object p at the same time does not subtract any of the value of a while having -y lowers the desirability of a .
A sufficient condition which ensures that the interdependence among objects is weak and that guarantees the existence of an equilibrium is that the demands of all agents satisfy the Gross Substitute (GS) assumption introduced by KelsoCrawford (1982) . Heuristically the dem.and of agent i satisfies the GS ccrdition if, when the price of an object -let us say ,f3 -increases while the prices of all other objects stay the same, then the objects other than p which were demanded by agent i are still demanded by this agent. This implies that there is no object which was demanded by agent i because it "fitted" especially well with P, but is no longer desirable when 0 becomes too expensive. To state the formal definition of the GS property, let us adopt the following convention: we say that the object a in the demand of agent i at prices p if it belongs to at least one subset of objects demanded by agent i at p.
Definition 2.3. The demand o f agent i satisfies the Gross Substitute property
i f for any p E ~1~1 ,
The Gross Substitute property however is not a condition on the primitive characteristics of the economy (the utility functions V(i, .)) but a condition on the derived demand functions (or more accurately demand correspondences). In this paper we will study a condition in the same spirit, which is stronger, but is made directly on the utility functions. The "Cardinality Condition" that we impose requires that the marginal contribution of an object only depends on the number of objects to which it is added. This condition prevent interactions in utilities among objects-like objects a and P fitting especially well togetherwhich create problems for the existence of equilibrium. In the following section we prove that if the utility functions are submodular and satisfy the Cardinality Condition, the set of equilibrium prices has the lattice property found in the matching model:; with quasi-linear utilities. Thus if pM(a)
is the maximum value of object a for any equilibrium and p,(a) its lowest value in any equilibrium, then the vectors pM and p, are also equilibrium prices. Of course pM is the vector of equilibrium prices which is the most favorable for the sellers and p, the most favorable for the buyers. Moreover the prices pM and p, have a natural economic interpretatioin: pM (a) is the social surplus created by object a (to be precisely defined in Section 3) while p,(a) is the value of a in its second best use (also to be defined in ;Section 3).
Similar properties of the equilibrium prices have been independently derived in a recent paper by Gul and Stacchetti (1996) under the assumption that the demands of all agents satisfy the Gross Substitute property. However the proofs are different in nature from the proofs of this paper. In the quasi-linear economies with large endowments of money that we are considering the existence of equilibrium and the Second Theorem of Welfare economics (Pareto optimal allocations maximizing the sum of akents' utilities can be supported by prices) are equivalent, since the equilibrium prices do not depend on the income distribution (see The analysis of this section is made under the following set of assumptions on the utility functions which will not be repeated ASSUMPTION : For all i E I, the utility function V(i, .) is submodular and satisfy the Cardinality Condition Let a be an efficient assignment of the objects C2 to the I agents. The goal of this section is to derive the prices supporting this allocation of the objects. In a model with divisible goods and quasi-linear utilities, the prices supporting a Pareto optimal allocation are given by the multipliers associated to the scarcity constraints in the program of maximization of the sum of the utilities (social welfare) subject to the feasibility constraints. The envelope theorem then permit interpreting the multiplier associated to thc scarcity constraint for a good (let us say good a ) as the change in social welfare resulting from a marginal decrease or increase in the supply of this good. Suppose now that good a is indivisible and exists in a single unit. If/ we proceed by analogy, there are two changes in the supply of a which play the role of a marginal change in the supply of a when the good is divisible: the supply can be decreased by one unit by taking the good a out of the available supply of goods; or the supply can be increased by one unit by adding a copy of a to the supply of available goods. These changes induce changes in social welfare analogous to the changes in social welfare accompanying a marginal change in the supply of a divisible good. We will prove that these changes in social welfare define the maximum and minimum prices supporting the efficient allocation u.
Let us thus define the social welfare created by a supply R of objects by
Define pM as the change in social welfare when the object a is taken out of the available objects, i.e.
or alternatively as the contribution of a to the social welfare. To define the minimum prices, for all cr E R let 6 denote an exact copy of object a. To define the social welfare associated to R U 6 , we need to extend the utility functions to subsets of R U 6 containing both a and i5. The extension is made in the following way: if A is a subset of 0 U ii such that a E A,
Thus no agent benefits from having two copies of the same object. With this convention, there is always an efficient assignment of R U 6 which does not give a and 6 to the same agent (even if only one agent has any use for a , as long as we assume free disposal). In all that follows, we will only consider efficient assignments p of R U 6 such that p(i) E R. In the normal case where several agents have a positive utility for a , an. efficient allocation of R U a! defines the / second best use of a , since it becomes possible to give cr to the agent i who has it in an efficient allocation of R, and to give a copy to the agent who would most benefit from a after agent i (see the Remark after Lemma 3. give respectively the highest and lowest possible equilibrium prices for object a.
Proposition 3.1. Let a be an efficient assignment of R, and suppose that there
Proof. Since the vector p is supporting the assignment a, for all i E I , and for all
be an efficient assignment of R\ a among I, and let p be an efficient assignment of
all i E I. Summing up this inequali.ties, we get U ( Q ) -p(a) > U(Q\a) and
The next two lemmas will be frequently used in proving that pM and p, are equilibrium price vectors. that the agent who has a in the assignment a also has it in the assignment p.
Proof.
Step 1: Let T be an efficient assignment of R\a among I . Partition the set I of agents between the subsets
and suppose that II is nqt empty, that is for some i E I , lr(i)l > la(i)l. Choose an agent i E 11, There exist P E ~( i ) such that /3 E a ( j ) for some agent j # i. 
Therefore, which proves that the new assignment of R\a is as efficient as I-. If the inequality is strict, this is a contradiction with the fact that r is an efficient assignment of Q\a among I. Thus there must be equality, and the new assignment r* obtained by shifting P from agent i to agent j is an efficient assignment of R\a among I which has decreased by one the number of objects attributed to the agents of Il.
Suppose now that jr(j) 1 1 la(j) 1 , that is j E II U 12. Then there exists an object Dl in ~( j )
which is not in a(.j) and is thus in a ( j l ) for some agent jl. 
Adding up these equalities and inequalitie: leads to where the last inequality is implied by the efficiency of a.
Thus as long as an efficient assignment T of R\a is such that Il is not empty it is possible to construct another efficient assignment T* with one less object attributed to the agents of Il and one more to the agents of 13. In a finite number of such steps we must find and efficient assignment T of O\a such that Il is empty.
Step 2: Consider now an efficient assignment p of R U 6 and partition the set
I into
If J1 is non empty, choose an age:nt i in J1. There is an object Po which is in a(i) and not in p(i), thus which is in p(jo) for some agent jo. If jo is in J3, transfer Po from agent jo to agent i and stop there. If agent jo is in J1 U J2 there is an object Dl which is in u(jO) and in p(jl) for some agent jl different from jo. Transfer from jl to jo and continue the procedure until an agent of J3 is reached which has to happen sin.ce the objects Do, PI,. . . can be chosen to be different and some objects must belong to agents of J3 which is a non empty set. The same type of equalities/inequalities as in Step 1 show that the new assignment of R U G so obtained is efficient and gives one more object to the agents of J1. Transferring objects to these ::gents must lead in a finite number of step to an efficient allocation of R U G for which the set J1 is empty.
Step 3: Let p be an efficient assig;nment of R U G , which, by Step 2, can be chosen such that Ip(i)l L, la(i)l for all i (and also such that p(i) E fl for all i).
Let a be the agent who has a under a. who has it under u and attributes the second copy of a to the agent who, after -i, would benefit most of consuming a-perhaps after a reallocation of the other objects.
We now prove that pM and p,,, are equilibrium prices supporting the efficient allocations of the objects R.
pM supports the efficient assignments of R to I
Lemma 3.4. Let a be an efficient assignment of R among I. For all
(ii) Let p rj ! a(i), and suppose that then,
By Lemma 3.3 there exists an assignment, T , of R\ P among I such that 
U(R) < U(R\P) + V ( i , r ( i ) U p) -V ( i , r ( i ) ) I U(R)
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 3.5. For all i E I , there is A E P(R) such that JAl = la(i)( and exists. In order to contradict inequality (3.1) we construct an assignment of R\ P from T by removing the object P from the agent who has it under T and "appropriately" assigning the object a.
(i), p M ( P ) 2 V ( i , a(i)uP)-V ( i , a ( i ) ) . This implies, since IBI > la-(i)l, that p-''<($) > V ( i , B ) -V(i,B\P).
Since B E D(i,pM), it must be that pM(j3) = V ( i , B ) -V(i,B\P), so that B\ P E D(i,pM
a(i). Let us show that A U /?\a is also in ~( i ,~* ) .

Suppose this is not true. Then it must be that V ( i , A )
Consider the agent jl who receives under T . If jl = i , then take p from agent i and replace it by o. If jl # i then since P E r ( j l ) and P 4 a ( j l ) , and since lr(j1)l I lu(jl)l, there is an object P1 in a ( j l ) which is not in r ( j l ) . If this object is either o or is such that it bel.ongs to ~( i ) , then the procedure stops: in the first case replace P by a in the assignment of agent j l , in the second replace p by 0 1 for agent jl and replace P1 by cr for agent i. If ,B1 cannot be either a or an object of ~( i ) , then there exists an agent j2 such that Dl E 7 ( j 2 ) . By the same reasoning , since PI 4 u ( j 2 ) there exist an object P2 in a ( j 2 ) which is not in 7 ( j 2 ) .
If either this object is a or if it belongs to ~( i ) ,
then procedure stops by replacing P by P1 for agent j l , and Pl by a for agent j2 in the first case,by P2 in the second case and h by a for agent i; otherwise it continues. As long as the procedure continues the objects P1,P2,. . . , can 'be chosen so as to be different from each other since each time that an object in ~( j )
there is a corresponding object in a ( j : ) . Since there is a finite number of objects the procedure must end finding an agent j, such that there exists an object P, in / a(j,) which is either a or is such that @ , E ~( i ) .
in the first case consider the assignment of R\ P such that p is repllaced by PI for agent j l , P1 is replaced by & for agent j2,. . . , and Pm-l is replaced t;. a: for agent j , . In the second case p is replaced by PI for agent j l , & ils replaced by P2 for agent j2,. . . , is replaced by P, for agent j , and P, is replaced by a for agent i. 9
agents j l , . . . , j,,, can be chosen so as to be different from each other1 same agent je is chosen twice, i.e. if for some ! 2 1, r 2 1 , jl = je object PL+, can directly be chosen in a ( j e ) instead of Pe the first ti jc is selected. We now use the assignment just constructed to the difference U(R\a) -L7(R\P). Consider the first case where P, 
Proof. (i) Since we have proved that pM is an equilibrium price, Proposition 3.1 implies that p, 5 pM. Since, by Lemma 3.4, pM satisfies the inequality (i), SO does p, .
(ii) If 13 $! o ( i ) , adding P to the objects of i creates an assignment of R U a. then there is an agent jl such that Po E a(jl). By the same reasoning, since Po 4 p(jl), and Ip(jl)( L Ia(jl)l, there is an object PI in p(jl) which is not in o(j1). If PI belongs to a(k) or cr(i), then the procedure stops by replacing Po by i5 for agent j, P1 by ,& for agent jl, and by for agent k in the first case, and P by pl for agent i in the second case; otherwise it continues. As long as the procedure continues the objects P1,& ...., can be chosen so as to be different from each other since each time that an object in a(1) is not in p(l), and since Ip(l)( 2 la(l)l , there is a corresponding object in p(1). Since there is a finite number of objects the procedure must end finding an agent j, such that Pm E p(jm), and Dm 4 ~( j , ) , and such that Dm is in a(k) or a(i). In the first case consider the assignment of 0 U i5 such that is replaced by 6 for agent j, pl is replaced by Po for agent jl , P2 is replaced by P1 for agent jz, .... ., Pm is replaced -by Prn-1 for agent j,, and ,B is replaced by P, for agent k. In the second case Po is replaced by G for agent j, pl is replaced by Po for agent jl, f i is replaced by PI for agent j2, . . .. ., Om is replaced by PP,,-l for agent j,, and is replaced by Dm for agent i. Note that, as in the proofs of Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.6, we can assume w.1.o.g. that the agents j l , . . . , j , are all different.
We now use the assign,ment just constructed to find a bound on the difference
. Consider the case where Dm E a(i). Thus the set of prices supporting the assignment a is a lattice, and being closed, it is complete.
BY
Note that choosing prices independently for each object a between pM(cr) and p, (cr) does not generally lead to a vector of equilibrium prices, as shown by the following example:
Example 3.11. : Let e E E be such that I = (1,2,3), R = {a,P,7). The reservation values of the agents for the different subsets of objects are given in the following table:
For this economy the efficient assignment is u(1) = {aP),u(2) = 0,a(3) = {y).
The vectors pM and p, are
The price vector p = (4,7,7) however is not an equilibrium price vector since at these prices agent 3 would demand object a and not object y. The prices of objects need to be compatible: in particular the surplus of agent 3 on object y has to be as least as large as on objects a. The set of equilibrium prices is ((4 + &, 7, ~( 7 ) ) 1 6 < ~( 7 )
I m i 4 6 + E., 7)), 0 I E. 5 3).
Relation between the Cardinality Condition and Gross Substitut ability
/
We mentioned in the Introduction and in Section 2 that, for submodular reservation values, the Cardinality Condition implies that agents' demands satisfy the Gross Substitute property. We now formally prove this claim. The proof uses the following properties of agents' demands when their reservation value functions satisfy submodularity and the Cardinality Condition. 
, where the last inequaiity comes from the fact that Thus there are more "free" parameters with the GS assumption than with the Cardinality Condition. It would be interesting to characterize all reservation functions which lead to demands satisfying the GS property, in order to find which interpretable restrictions on the preferences of the agents are compatible with the GS property. Hopefully, future research will provide an answer to this quest ion.
